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ABSTRACT 
STATE, SECURITY, AND INTEREST: LIMITS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
Bekir İlhan 
M.A. Thesis, July 2018 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Fuat Keyman 
 
Keywords: International cooperation, interstate negotiation, structural realism, rational 
bargaining theory 
Under what conditions do security seeker states more inclined to initiate cooperation? 
What determines negotiation outcomes? Standard realist explanations argue that 
security-seeker states rarely cooperate even if their interests converge. This study 
proposes an analytical framework which argues that international cooperation and 
negotiation can best be explained through two theories, arrayed in a multistage model, 
which takes its fundamental assumptions from theories of structural realism and rational 
bargaining. Basically, the framework requires, first, the application of structural realist 
theory to explain the conditions under which states initiate cooperation; and second, the 
application of a rationalist theory of bargaining in order to explain what determines 
negotiation outcomes. With respect to the emergence of international cooperation, the 
framework argues that power symmetry and a large number of actors, as structural 
factors, conjointly increase the likelihood of international cooperation. A large number 
of actors with evenly distributed power will be more likely to initiate cooperation 
because such actors will believe that relative gains and losses from cooperation will not 
shift the balance of power in favor of one actor. As for interstate negotiation, the 
framework argues that whether negotiating actors exchange concessions depends 
largely on the relative bargaining power of the actors rather than their military power. 
The study focuses empirically on the negotiations for the European Defense Community 
(EDC) between France and the Federal Republic of Germany and concludes that the 
limits of European integration lie in the changing relative bargaining power of the 
member states in a given policy area not the nature of that policy area. 
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ÖZET 
DEVLET, GÜVENLİK VE ÇIKAR: AVRUPA ENTEGRASYONUNUN SINIRLARI 
 
Bekir İlhan 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası işbirliği, Devletlerarası müzakere, Yapısal Realizm, 
Rayonel pazarlık teorisi 
Güvenlik arayan devletler hangi koşullar altında işbirliği başlatmaya daha meyillidir? 
Devletlerarası müzakere sonuçlarını ne belirler? Standart realist açıklamalar, güvenlik 
arayan devletlerin çıkarları uyuşsa bile nadiren işbirliği yaptığını ileri sürmektedir. Bu 
tez, uluslararası işbirliği ve devletlerarası müzakereleri açıklamak için yapısal realizm 
ve rasyonel pazarlık teorilerini içeren iki aşamalı bir analitik çerçeve sunmaktadır. 
Temel olarak, bu çerçeve, devletlerin hangi koşullar altında işbirliği başlattıklarını 
açıklamak için yapısal realist teoriyi; devletler arası müzakere sonuçlarını neyin 
belirlediğini açıklamak için de rasyonalist bir pazarlık teorisi içermektedir. Yapısal 
realist bir açıdan bu çerçeve, gücün devletler arasında kabaca eşit dağıldığı bir bölgede 
işbirliği yapacak aktörlerin sayısı artıkça devletlerin işbirliği yapmaya daha meyilli 
olacaklarını iddia etmektedir. Eşit güce sahip çok sayıda aktörün işbirliği başlatma 
ihtimali daha yüksek olacaktır çünkü böyle bir durumda ilgili aktörler işbirliğinden 
kaynaklanan göreceli kazanç ve kayıpların mevcut güç dengesini bir aktör lehine aniden 
değiştirmeyeceğini değerlendireceklerdir. Devletlerarası müzakere konusunda ise bu 
çerçeve, uluslararası müzakereler esnasında devletlerin birbirlerine taviz verip 
vermemelerinin müzakereci aktörlerin askeri güçlerinden ziyade göreceli pazarlık 
gücüne bağlı olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu tez, yapısal faktörlerin işbirliği ihtimalini; 
devletlerin göreceli pazarlık gücünün ise müzakere sonuçlarını nasıl etkilediğini 
açıklamak için Fransa ile Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti arasındaki Avrupa Savunma 
Topluluğu müzakerelerini incelemektedir. Avrupa entegrasyonu konusunda bu tez 
entegrasyonun sınırlarının belli bir politika alanının doğasından ziyade devletlerin söz 
konusu alandaki göreceli pazarlık gücünde yatmakta olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This study aims to explore the following questions: Under what conditions do 
security seeker states more inclined to initiate cooperation? And what determines 
negotiation outcomes? 
So far, issues related to international cooperation have mostly been studied 
under the framework of liberal and institutionalist international relations theories. Those 
theories provide valuable insights for understanding the determinants of non-altruistic 
cooperation among states. However, liberal theories have their shortcomings when it 
comes to security cooperation. In terms of international cooperation, the extant liberal 
studies have emphasized the role of domain structure (i.e., security, economy) to 
explain whether cooperation is possible. Accordingly, states are more likely to 
cooperate in the realm of economy; and less likely to cooperate in the realm of security 
since these domains contain different payoffs. States would have less incentive to 
cooperate in military affairs because the cost of being cheated is very high in that 
domain. Therefore, conventional liberal international relations theories are more 
concerned with cooperation in economic affairs while realists deal with security issues. 
Even though security issues have always been attributed to realist theories, 
realists have neglected various dimensions of security cooperation among nations. 
They, instead, have focused on alliances. States form alliances against security threats.
1
 
The term “alliance” does not necessarily mean “security cooperation” since security 
                                                                
1 For the literature on Alliance formation, see Walt, S. M. (1990). The origins of alliances. Cornell University Press; 
Snyder, G. H. (2007). Alliance politics. Cornell University Press. 
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cooperation can also exist in the absence of a threat.
2
 This is what realists miss when it 
comes to security cooperation.  
Given this gap in the literature, this thesis examines the structural factors that 
lead states to coordinate their security and economic policies, under uncertainty, relative 
gain and cheating problems. The paper focuses empirically on the negotiations for the 
European Defense Community (EDC) between France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and attempts to identify how structural factors and states’ relative bargaining 
power determine negotiation outcomes at the international level. 
1.1 The Argument of the Thesis 
 This study argues that international cooperation and negotiation can best be 
explained through two theories, arrayed in a multistage model, which takes its 
fundamental assumptions from theories of structural realism and rational bargaining. 
The aim of the study is not to develop a new theory or model to explain international 
cooperation. Rather, the study attempts to nest one grand theory—a structural realist 
theory of international cooperation and one rationalist middle-range theory—an inter-
state rational bargaining theory, within a two-stage structured framework. Basically, the 
framework requires, first, the application of a structural realist theory to explain why 
states initiate cooperation; and second, the application a rationalist theory of bargaining 
in order to explain what determines whether negotiating states strike a deal at the 
international level. To explain international cooperation, hence, two tasks are crucial. 
First one needs to explain what factors lead states to initiate cooperation. Second, one 
needs to explain what factors determine the outcome of interstate bargaining. 
To begin with the structural realist part of the framework, this thesis argues that 
power symmetry and a larger number of actors, as structural factors, conjointly increase 
the likelihood of international cooperation.  
When power is equally and evenly distributed in a geographic domain, states in 
that domain will assess that their security is less threatened since no single state can 
become the hegemon in a very short time period. This will lead to states to be less 
concerned about the possibility of falling behind their partners. States, therefore, may 
                                                                
2 Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations. 
Princeton University Press. 
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neglect the negative effects of relative gains problem, as the gains to be obtained from 
cooperation will not immediately change the balance of power in that region. 
Along with power symmetry, the larger the number of actors to cooperate, the 
less important the relative gains concern will be. In such a situation, the relative 
advantage of better-positioned states will be neutralized by the gains obtained from 
other weaker states. Since there will be more than one cooperation dyad, states will 
have the opportunity to compensate their relative losses in one dyad with a more 
favorable dyad.  
To sum up, more actors with evenly distributed power will be more likely to 
initiate cooperation because such actors will believe that relative losses from 
cooperation will not shift the balance of power in favor of one actor. 
As for the rational bargaining part of the framework, the initiation of cooperation 
does not guarantee that the involving parties will reach an agreement. Cooperation may 
breakdown. According to the conventional structural realist logic military power is the 
most important tool to manipulate other actors’ strategies and positions in a cooperation 
setting. So the argument goes, the stronger the state, the more its bargaining power. 
However, this logic fails to explain cases in which weaker states have the leverage to 
impact bargaining outcome. 
The framework argues that reaching an agreement at the international level 
depends on the relative bargaining power of cooperating actors rather than their military 
power. The relative bargaining power of a state depends on the following conditions: 
whether a unilateral action is available for that state; whether the state has outside/inside 
options; and whether the state has the capability to propose an alternative coalition, and 
urgency of preferences. 
Combined with each other, these factors determine the bargaining power of a 
state in the face of its partners. Relative bargaining power influences whether 
negotiating states exchange concessions. If mutual concessions are made it is more 
likely that the involving states would strike an agreement. 
As for the empirical puzzle, this thesis deals with the origins and limits of 
European integration in broader terms. Despite high-level of economic interdependence, 
European states have not been eager to further military integration. Much of the work 
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on this issue has emphasized the nature of policy domains. Accordingly, states more 
inclined to cooperate in the realm of economy since the cost of being cheated in this 
realm is lower than in the realm of security. 
In general, regarding the origins of European integration, this thesis argues that 
the equal distribution of power in Western Europe immediately after the World War II 
allowed the states to initiate cooperation in needed policy areas. At the time, most 
Western European countries were warworn. There was no potential hegemonic country 
in Western Europe to dominate the region. The total power was distributed evenly 
among major nations like Germany, France, and Italy. Since the relative gains problem 
is more salient when security dilemma conditions prevail, Western European states 
managed to start cooperative endeavors to improve their economy and military. Without 
the fear of falling behind their partners, Western European states sought to maximize 
their absolute gains. 
While the balance of power made European integration possible at the 
beginning, the members' relative bargaining power in various policy area does not allow 
the integration push forward. In the realm of security, the major European states have 
not been eager to further develop an intra-European (rather than transatlantic) 
cooperation arrangement due to NATO. The alliance has played a crucial role for 
European nations in the provision of their security. NATO, as being an alternative 
option, has impeded a possible European security integration. Today, the security 
cooperation among European states is limited compared to the integration in the realm 
of economy. 
1.2 The Importance and Contribution of the Thesis 
 The analytical framework presented in this study contributes to understanding 
international cooperation in various ways. First, with respect to theoretical contribution, 
it expands the realist sight on international cooperation by showing how states neglect 
relative gains problem even under anarchy and uncertainty. As I will discuss in further 
sections of the study, the framework shows that, unlike standard realist theories, when 
faced with the probability of cooperation, states focus on absolute gains, not relative 
gains. 
Second, the framework attempts to set light to negotiation process once 
cooperation has started, which is an understudied subject for structural realist theories. 
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Most realist accounts explaining international cooperation fail to address the factors that 
were influential both before and after the negotiation process begins. This framework 
offers a parsimonious explanation on why states initiate cooperation and what 
determines negotiation outcome.  
Third, as a conceptual contribution, the framework treats the concept of 
cooperation as a distinct concept from the concept of alliance. Regarding these two 
concepts, there is an ambiguity in the family of realist theories. Most realist studies on 
determinants of international cooperation use these concepts interchangeably. This 
misunderstanding has led to realist theories handle the problem of international 
cooperation in a misleading way. The framework shows how international cooperation 
is possible and not an anomaly but a puzzle to be solved. 
1.3 The Concept of Cooperation 
 To explain the causes and consequences of international cooperation, we should 
first understand the nature of the concept of cooperation. To understand the nature of 
cooperation, we, first, need to define the concept clearly. Then, we need to distinguish 
cooperation from other types of state behavior. Finally, we need to identify the forms of 
cooperation so that we can make robust analysis regarding the concept. 
To begin with the definition of cooperation, despite the fact that realists and 
liberals diverge over the causes and limits of international cooperation, there is a 
compromise over the definition of the concept in the discipline of international 
relations.
3
 Most of international relations scholars employ Robert Keohane’s definition 
of cooperation. Keohane identifies the occurrence of cooperation as follows: “[…] 
when actors adjust their behavior to actual or anticipated preferences of others, 
through a process of policy coordination.”4 As the definition suggests, policy 
coordination is an important feature of cooperation. Policy coordination occurs through 
a process. The puzzle that needs to be solved lies in that process. 
                                                                
3 Milner, H. (1992). International theories of cooperation among nations: Strengths and weaknesses. World politics, 
44(3), p. 467. 
4 Keohane, R. O. (2005). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton 
University Press. p. 51. 
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Liberal scholars argue that policy coordination requires reciprocity—which 
means the exchange of roughly equivalent values of both goods and bads.
5
 As a liberal, 
Keohane notes that what is central for the emergence of cooperation is contingency and 
equivalence.
6
 Joseph Grieco, as a realist, on the other hand, argues that cooperation 
occurs when involving parties achieve a balanced distribution of gains.
7
 Hans 
Morgenthau points out states grant concessions in order to gain equal compensations.
8
 
Liberals and realists put a similar requirement for the emergence of cooperation. As 
Helen Milner notes Grieco’s notion of balanced exchange sounds remarkably like 
Keohane’s conception of reciprocity.9 
Further, according to both approaches, one important requirement for 
international cooperation is that the cooperating parties expect that they will mutually 
exchange some values. While implicitly agreeing on the exchange of values, liberals 
and realists, however, are divided on how the values that will emerge as the result of 
this mutual exchange will be distributed among the parties. This divergence leads the 
discipline to a well-known debate—relative gains and absolute gains debate, as will be 
discussed in more detail in the later chapters of this study. 
To sum up, we can understand that there are two important elements that form 
cooperation. First, the common definition assumes that cooperative behaviors are 
toward some goal/s, second, it implies that involved actors will be better off by the 
expected mutual, if not equal, gains.
10
 The essence of cooperation is, thus, policy 
coordination and adjustment to get mutual gain. 
After the nature of cooperation has been examined, it is equally important to 
understand what cooperation is not. In general, the concept of competition is used as the 
opposite form of the concept of cooperation. Competition is a phenomenon that is 
examined mostly in realist international relations theories. While the parties expect 
mutual gains in the cooperation, the parties try to prevent each other's gains in the 
                                                                
5 Milner, Ibid., p. 471. 
6 Keohane, R. O. (1986). Reciprocity in international relations. International organization, 40(1), Relations, p. 5. 
7 Grieco, J. M. (1990). Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade. Cornell 
University Press. p. 47.  
8 Morgenthau, Hans, (1948). Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace. Nova York, Alfred Kopf. p. 
135-136. 
9 Milner, Ibid., p. 471. 
10 Ibid., p. 468. 
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competition.
11
 In addition, the concept of cooperation should not be confused with the 
concept of alliance, another concept which is often studied by realist theories. Alliances 
also require mutual policy adjustment in a similar way as cooperation does, but, as 
George Liska has stated, “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or 
something”,12 while cooperation is for something. 
Finally, touching upon forms of cooperation is crucial in understanding the 
causes and consequences of international cooperation, which will be examined in the 
following chapters. Cooperation can emerge in various ways. Oran Young classifies 
three forms of cooperation. Accordingly, cooperation can be tacit, negotiated, and 
imposed.
13
 Tacit cooperation does not require a clear and explicit communication 
between the cooperating parties. The Prisoner Dilemma situation, which is used in game 
theoretical models, can be considered as an example of tacit cooperation since the actors 
are not allowed to communicate.
14
  
Imposed cooperation suggests that cooperation can be enforced by a hegemonic 
state in the system. This type of cooperation requires mutual policy adjustment in 
certain policy domains by minor actors and the hegemonic power itself. Imposed 
cooperation falls into the category of hegemonic stability theories which will be 
examined in later sections of this work. 
The third type of cooperation is negotiated cooperation. This is the most 
common form of interstate cooperation. This type is also easily identified since it 
involves an explicit communication and negotiation process between and among the 
cooperating parties. Most of the literature on international cooperation study this type of 
cooperation. This study will take into account negotiated cooperation since the claim of 
this thesis is to offer a new analytical framework consists of both initiation and 
bargaining process of cooperative endeavors among states. 
1.4 Methodology 
                                                                
11 Ibid., p. 468. 
12 Liska, G. (1962). Nations in alliance: The limits of interdependence. Johns Hopkins Press. p. 12. 
13 See Young, O. R. (1989). International cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment. 
Cornell University Press; Young, O. R. (1980). International regimes: Problems of concept formation. World Politics, 
32(3), 331-356; Young, O. R. (1986). International regimes: Toward a new theory of institutions. World politics, 
39(1), 104-122. 
14 See Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World politics, 30(2), 167-214. 
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 In this study, I will combine case study and analytical narratives methods to test 
my argument. The reason I combine both methods is that using these two methods 
allows us to better evaluate the data and evidence. While analytical narratives method 
offers opportunities to deal with the key actors and their interaction, case studies, on the 
other hand, emphasize the role of key variables.
15
 So, by combining both methods, we 
will be able to evaluate the key actors, the context and the causal mechanism of the case 
presented in this study.  
To begin with, case studies are useful research techniques to make inferences 
and to describe events thoroughly. Case studies could be designed in a descriptive and 
explanatory fashion.
16
 In this study, I used an explanatory case study since this thesis' 
framework claims to explain and understand the determinant of international 
cooperation in the context of European integration. Since this thesis attempts to develop 
a new analytical framework, designing an explanatory case study would allow us to 
better deal with analytical and empirical issues. If this thesis had sought to test theories 
from the extant literature, it would be a necessity to use larger data sets and empirical 
resources. If there is a reasonable causal chain as the causal logic of the framework 
stipulates, then we can conclude that the argument offers a convincing explanation. 
Therefore, in order to understand the argument presented in the framework, then the 
thesis elaborates on a mainly unique case study, which is also compatible with 
analytical narrative methods.   
Analytical narratives method is a useful tool to evaluate the logic of an argument 
in the context of a particular case. This research method is usually used in studies 
involving rational choice theory. However, the method could be applied to other types 
of theories.
17
 Since the framework presented in this study involves a rational bargaining 
theory to understand the determinants of interstate negotiation process, this method 
would be a good strategy to analyze the negotiation process between Germany and 
France, regarding the European Defense Community. 
                                                                
15 Levi, M., & Weingast, B. R. (2016). Analytic Narratives, Case Studies, and Development, p. 5. 
16 See George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. Mit Press.; 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Designing case studies. 
17 For a comprehensive analysis of the method, see Bates, R. H., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, J. L., & Weingast, B. 
(1999). Analytic narratives. 
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Generally, analytical narratives method consists of several steps, as Levi and 
Weingast note.
18
 In the first step, the researcher should identify the principal players, 
their preferences, and the rules of the game. In the second step, the researcher present 
regarding the sequence of interaction. Finally, the method requires comparative statics 
which is consists of the evaluation of the model.
19
 As a widely used research method, 
analytic narratives method allows us to evaluate and demonstrate parsimonious causal 
mechanisms. 
In this study, I used both primary and secondary resource to collect data. I used 
the Foreign Relations of the United States series which contain historical documents 
regarding the USA's relations with foreigner countries. It also contains American 
diplomatic notes, documents, and resources on American-Western European relations. I 
also used the Correlates of War project's National Material Capabilities dataset. As for 
secondary resources I mainly benefited from published scholarly materials which 
examine the process of European Defense Community. 
1.5 The Organization of the Thesis 
 This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I will describe the extant 
literature on international cooperation in the context of European integration. In that 
chapter, I will, first, compare three rationalist explanations. After presenting their 
arguments, I will address their weaknesses and shortcomings in certain aspects of 
international cooperation and particularly European integration.  
 In Chapter 3, I will analyze structural realism and the problem of international 
cooperation. I will first examine structural realist arguments on the state, security, and 
interest. After presenting structural realism, I will examine standard structural realist 
approach to the problem of international cooperation. 
In Chapter 4, I will present my framework. In the light of structural realism, I 
will seek to explain how security-seeker states initiate cooperation if certain conditions 
met. I will introduce the arguments of power symmetry and the number of actors. 
In Chapter 5, I will present a rational bargaining theory in order to explain the 
determinants of negotiation outcomes at the international level. I will first examine the 
                                                                
18 Levi and Weingast, Ibid., p. 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
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sources of relative bargaining power. Then, I will introduce three hypotheses regarding 
relative bargaining power and interstate negotiations. 
After the theory chapters, I will examine the case to test my argument and the 
hypotheses. I will concentrate on two conferences regarding European Defense 
Community project. I will show how relative bargaining power of Germany and France 
interplayed in striking an agreement. 
In the final chapter of the study, I will discuss the argument of the thesis. First, I 
will summarize the analytical framework I introduced. Next, I will analyze how my 
framework fits the case and how it offers a better explanation regarding the origins and 
limits of European integration. Finally, I will conclude by discussing how my 
framework applied to future research. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 It is often claimed that European integration is a unique process. However, it 
does not require a unique theory to explain the causes of the integration process.
20
  
European integration The European integration project is, in essence, a matter of 
international cooperation since the member states coordinate their policies in various 
areas. It is a fact that the level of cooperation in the European political communities is 
very high. While the determinants of the high level of cooperation is an important task 
to understand, we need to understand first the causes of cooperation. The discipline of 
international relations has a vast literature on the causes of European integration. I 
categorize theories on European integration into two camps: rationalist and 
constructivist theories. In this study, I will only examine rationalist theories due to the 
fact that the focus of this thesis is materialistic and non-altruistic rational cooperation. 
Rationalist explanations on European integration can be divided into three groups: the 
liberal intergovernmentalism, structural realist accounts, and institutionalist 
explanations. 
To begin with structural realist theories, the essence of these accounts is that 
European integration is best understood through the balance of power politics logic. 
Scholars such as John Mearsheimer argue that it is the American pacifier which made 
Europe peaceful during the Cold War.
21
  Accordingly, the existence of American 
military forces in the continent has allowed Western European states to cooperate 
without the fear of being exploited. If America withdraws its forces from the continent, 
these scholars argue, Europe would return to pre-Second World War power politics.  
                                                                
20 Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), p. 474. 
21
 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2010). Why is Europe peaceful today?. European Political Science, 9(3), 387-397. 
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Sebastian Rosato, on the other hand, argues that European integration is best 
understood as an attempt by the major western European states to balance against the 
Soviet Union and one another.
22
  Accordingly, immediately after the end of the Second 
World War, Western European states were in a weaker position compared to the Soviet 
Union which had an overwhelming military power at that time. Given the fact that no 
war-ravaged European country could balance Soviet power alone, the major European 
powers such as France and Germany thus began to build a military-economic coalition 
in order to check the Soviet Union. Most of the Western European states were required 
to balance the Soviets through mobilizing their available resources, because of the 
unprecedented nature of Soviet power. To balance each other in the coalition, Rosato 
further argues, the major European powers have established institutions. Those 
institutions' main role is to provide joint control over the decision-making process in the 
coalition.
23
 
Institutionalist explanations, as the name suggests, focus on the role of the 
institutions. The core idea of institutionalism is that institutions are actors facilitating 
international cooperation by helping states to overcome cooperation problems.
24
  The 
leading role of institutions, therefore, is promoting cooperation by providing 
information; solving distribution problems, and reducing transaction costs for states.
25
  
Institutions are also important for provision of collective goods in international politics. 
Due to the free rider problem, states do not act unilaterally to achieve a common 
interest. Institutions create forums and platforms for states to interact. Institutions 
promote international cooperation by creating iterated games. When it comes to the 
European Union, institutionalists argue that European states have established 
institutions to reach mutual gain.  Given the idea that institutionalized cooperation is 
more likely to persist, institutions are key variables for explaining international 
cooperation. 
The third alternative argument on European integration is liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Its core argument is that European integration is a set of 
institutional decisions made by national governments as an outcome of interstate 
                                                                
22 Rosato, S. (2010). Europe united: power politics and the making of the European Community. Cornell University 
Press. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Keohane, R. O. (1988). International institutions: Two approaches. International studies quarterly, 32(4), 379-
396. 
25 See Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. International security, 20(1), 
39-51. 
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bargaining.
26
 Andrew Moravcsik notes that liberal intergovernmentalism is a three-level 
approach to explain international economic cooperation, particularly European 
integration.
27
  Accordingly, domestically determined preferences are the key drivers for 
governments to cooperate. However, governments cannot actualize all their preferences 
due to the fact that one state’s preferences may create externalities over another state. In 
order to achieve mutual gains and to overcome the impacts of externalities, states 
negotiate. The outcome of negotiations is dependent upon the relative bargaining power 
of the involved states. 
 The alternative arguments that I have summarized above provide important 
contributions for understanding the logic of international cooperation, and European 
integration as well. However, they have shortcomings in certain dimensions of 
international cooperation. 
 To begin with structural realist arguments, Rosato’s argument is more 
comprehensive compared to previous structural realist arguments. His theory of 
international cooperation is also based on the logic of the balance of power. However, 
his theory has two shortcomings. First, he treats European integration as if it were an 
alliance. Since the logic of alliances is different from the logic of cooperation, the 
European integration process cannot be better understood from Rosato’s perspective. 
International cooperation, by larger definition, is a kind of policy coordination and 
adjustment that states pursue to get mutual gain. Alliances, on the other hand, are only 
useful tools when states have to deal with an adversary. Another point about Rosato’s 
theory is that he, as a realist, does not touch upon relative gain problems. Distribution 
problems are the key factors which determine whether involving states reach an 
agreement.
28
 However, Rosato does not examine negotiation and bargaining dimensions 
of European integration despite the fact that he puts forward a realist international 
relations theory of international cooperation. 
To continue with institutionalist arguments, there are two essential problems 
with those arguments. First, institutionalist international relations theorists must 
overcome an endogeneity problem in their arguments. The essence of the endogeneity 
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Routledge. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. 
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problem is the question of whether states determine institutional designs or institutions 
determine state behavior, given the fact that institutions are formed by states. If the idea 
that institutions autonomously affect state behavior is true, then a new problem 
concerning the agency of international institutions arises: How can institutions be 
autonomous actors since they are, themselves, formed by states? Following the 
institutionalist logic, institutions are ontologically depended on states. This problem 
makes institutionalist accounts controversial given the fact that institutions are 
considered as the independent variable in these accounts.  
As for the liberal intergovernmentalism, the theory focuses mainly on the 
determinants of national preferences related to economy. Despite the fact that it does 
not suggest that economy is the only factor, liberal intergovernmentalism is usually 
applied to economically driven preferences and interactions. Thus, state preferences are 
considered in terms of economical denominators. The theory has a shortcoming in terms 
of formation of geopolitical interests related to security. The consequences of 
geopolitical interests of a state such as national security needs cannot be explained very 
well by using second level liberal-societal approaches. National security, by definition, 
is a public good that states must provide it for all citizens, not for a specific social group 
or a business circle. While one's economic interest may exclude the economic interest of 
another, no one, theoretically, can be excluded from the security umbrella of a state. 
Societal level theories like liberal intergovernmentalism fail to explain the domestically-
driven security-seeking behavior of states.
29
  
                                                                
29 For a study on bureaucratic politics, see Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the 
Cuban missile crisis." 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRUCTURAL REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The analytic framework presented in this thesis relies on the idea that security 
seeking is a behavior that derives from the structure of international politics, not 
domestic politics and domestic structures. The framework, thus, argues that structural 
realism offers a more useful explanation to analyze international cooperation in the 
realm of security and economy. In this chapter, since this framework first requires the 
application of structural realism to understand the conditions in which states initiate 
cooperation, I will, firstly, briefly address the fundamental structural realist assumptions 
and arguments on the state, security, interest. Following this part, I will examine the 
problem of international cooperation. I will show how structural realism addresses the 
problem of international cooperation. 
3.2 Structural Realism 
 Theories are lenses that allow us to analyze events by drawing causal 
mechanisms and by finding regularities, models, and connections among phenomena in 
the complex structure of reality. By using these lenses we are able to explain and 
understand our past, present, and future. The discipline of international relations, like 
many other social sciences, involves explanatory theories and constructive theories.
30
 
Explanatory theories establish causal relations between dependent and independent 
variables and seek to build testable hypotheses while constructive theories based on the 
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idea that the knowledge obtained from scientific endeavors shapes the world rather than 
reflecting it. 
Realism, with its explanatory power, the concepts that it employs, and its various 
theories, is one of the leading family of theories in the discipline of international 
relations. Within the Realist paradigm, neorealism or structural realism
31
 has been the 
most powerful theory of the discipline during and after the Cold War era. Though 
criticized by other theories, especially after the end of the Cold War, it is still one of the 
leading international relations theories on explaining politics among nations. 
The most distinct feature of structural realism is the level of analysis it employs 
to explain patterns of international politics. When looking at its level of analysis, 
structural realism is a systemic theory as it attempts to explain state behavior by 
focusing on the international system.
32
 Kenneth Waltz, as a prominent structural realist, 
divides theories into two camps: reductionist and systemic theories. According to him, 
theories that study international politics at the individual and national level are 
reductionist theories, and theories that analyze international politics at the international 
level are systemic theories.
33
 He, further, argues that it is necessary to use systemic 
theories to understand international politics. 
34
 
Waltz’s system, basically, consists of interacting units and a political structure.  
He defines the concept of structure in terms of certain elements. These are; ordering 
principle (how are units related to each other?), differentiation of functions (how are 
political functions allocated?) and distribution of power (how is power distributed?).
35
  
To begin with, while the ordering principle of national level politics is hierarchy, 
the ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. There is a hierarchical order in 
a structure if units are subjected to certain rules. Under a hierarchic structure, units are 
not equal either formally or positionally. Also, each unit has a different function in such 
orders. Those who do not obey rules and do not perform their functions well may face 
sanctions by a higher authority. On the other hand, anarchic orders are the opposite of 
                                                                
31 I will use neorealism and structural realism interchangeably. 
32 Waltz, K. N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. Columbia University Press. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press. 
35 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; for a summary see.,  Burchill, Scott, et al. Theories of international 
relations. 
17 
 
hierarchical orders. In anarchic orders, functional differentiation among units is minimal 
and there is no higher authority to regulate the system. 
Since there is no higher authority upon all states, the structure of international 
politics is anarchic, according to structural realists. The anarchic structure engenders a 
state of nature at the international level. While the state of nature among individuals 
comes to an end when a sovereign emerges, the state of nature at the international 
political level never ends since there is no world state. Various theories of the realist 
paradigm, more or less, emphasize the anarchic environment of international politics. 
However, the concept of anarchy does not imply that international politics is chaotic. 
Anarchy is the absence of a rulemaking supreme authority which punishes and rewards 
units. 
After defining a system, Waltz, further, argues that, in an anarchical 
international environment, states are alike and perform the same function. They all have 
one function: to achieve a self-sufficient position, to ensure their security, and to fulfill 
the actions necessary to survive. As a result, if all international structures are anarchic 
and this implies a minimal functional differentiation among units, then international 
political structures differ only in terms of distribution of power. Power is defined in 
terms of military assets and capabilities. Following this logic, each state in the system 
has a share of the total power. This means that some states have little power while some 
states control a large amount of total power. Thus, each state, more or less, has some 
capacity to hurt another.
36
 The configuration of power defines characteristic of 
international systems since units are alike and perform the same function. 
Structural realism counts states as the most important and fundamental actor of 
international relations, as can be understood from the above. Non-state actors such as 
international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and multinational 
corporations are usually neglected by realists. This does not mean that such actors have 
no influence in international politics. Most realists recognize their role in international 
relations. However, when compared with the role of states, the role of such actors is 
minimal. This is why realists consider them as secondary actors and downplay their 
role. 
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Given the role of the state in realist theories, structural realists have common 
core assumptions about states operate in international politics. First of all, states are 
rational actors. According to this assumption, states make cost and benefit calculations 
and aim at maximizing their utility in their actions. The concept of rationality does not 
imply that states do not make mistakes. States may sometimes make mistakes due to 
miscalculations. The reason for this situation is that states act with imperfect 
information in a complex world. Another realist assumption about the state is that states 
are unitary actors. This assumption indicates that internal political systems, regimes, 
internal differences and cultures of states are not significant at the international level. 
These differences are not determinative in the outside world. In other words, structural 
realism’s states act as a unified and integrated unit in international politics. 
To sum up, structural realism regards the international system as the level of 
analysis, while it takes the state as the unit of analysis because it focuses on the 
behavior of states rather than behaviors of non-state and sub-state actors. The 
international system has a structure and this structure has certain characteristics. The 
most important feature of this structure is anarchy, and it forces states to practice certain 
behaviors resulting in international political relations. Realists argue that international 
political relations built on power politics due to the anarchy. Accordingly, some states 
are stronger, while others are less powerful. 
Structural realists further maintain that states do and should ensure their 
survival. In order to survive, states seek security through a certain amount of power. In 
a world characterized by anarchy and conflicting interests, power and power relations 
are the essential features of international relations. Some realist scholars argue that 
states’ most important preference is "national interest". According to classical realism, 
national interest is defined in terms of power.
37
 Structural realists, on the other hand, 
argues that the principal duty of decision-makers is to ensure national security. 
Therefore, they always have to prioritize national interest defined in terms of power and 
security instead of pursuing moral values. 
 While realists comprehend a competitive world, cooperation is a recurrent 
pattern in international politics. Structural realists argue that there are challenging 
barriers in front of states to achieve a real cooperation. States can start to cooperation 
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only if they defeat these barriers. In the next section of this chapter, I will first present 
the standard structural realist logic on international cooperation. 
 
3.3 The Problem of International Cooperation 
 Structural realists argue that there are two main problems which make 
international cooperation less likely and even imposable to emerge in certain policy 
domains.
38
 These problems are the relative gains problem and the cheating problem. 
Both problems derive from the fact that the structure of international politics impels 
states to seek security, according to realists. Since states seek to ensure their survival in 
a system characterized by anarchy, they are pre-occupied with security concerns.  
Moreover, structural realists contend that security concerns, even, determine 
states’ other preferences. Accordingly, states prioritize security over other second-
ranked preferences such as prestige and wealth. As Waltz puts “to pursue other goals, 
states, first, have to exist.”39 Even the behavior of a state in the realm of economy is 
determined by the calculation that how the possible results of this decision could affect 
the state’s security in the short and long runs. States’ preferences, hence, are driven by 
the international level forces, according to the structural realist logic. 
Structural realists further argue that states are positionally placed in the 
international system. This means that states are neither atomistically nor relationally 
placed, as liberals and constructivists respectively argue. Waltz puts this argument in 
that way: 
“In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states 
safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power. The first 
concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in 
the system."
40
 
Another structural realist Joseph Grieco advances the positionalist argument by 
positing that states are "defensively positionalist" entities.
41
 Defensive positionalism, in 
essence, implies that states seek to maintain their relative position since they are 
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40 Ibid. 
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positionally placed in the international system. This causes states to be more concerned 
with their relative losses rather than absolute gains, according to structural realists. 
Grieco puts this logic as follows: 
"[...] Realists argue that states are more likely to concentrate on the danger 
that relative gains may advantage partners and thus may foster the 
emergence of a more powerful potential adversary. Realism, then, finds 
that states are positional, but it also finds that state positionality is more 
defensive than offensive in nature."
42
  
According to structural realists, the fact that states are defensively positionalist 
entities causes "the relative gains problem", when they consider co-operating. Grieco 
describes this problem as follows: 
“[…] a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its 
commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are 
achieving, or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains. It will eschew 
cooperation even though participation in the arrangement was providing it, 
or would have provided it, with large absolute gains. Moreover, a state 
concerned about relative gains may decline to cooperate even if it is 
confident that partners will keep their commitments to a joint arrangement. 
Indeed, if a state believed that a proposed arrangement would provide all 
parties absolute gains, but would also generate gains favoring partners, then 
greater certainty that partners would adhere to the terms of the arrangement 
would only accentuate its relative gains concerns. Thus, a state worried 
about relative gains might respond to greater certainty that partners would 
keep their promises with a lower, rather than a higher, willingness to 
cooperate.”43 
As for the cheating problem, structural realists argue that the risk of being 
cheated is always possible in world politics since there is no world government upon 
states. Therefore, it is difficult for states to believe that their partners would keep the 
commitments of an agreement. Some structural realists argue that a hegemonic state 
may play the role of an international government by imposing cooperation in certain 
geographies and domains. Accordingly, the existence of a hegemon makes other minor 
and secondary states to find themselves in a hierarchic order. Further, relying on the 
idea that hegemonic states would punish those who defect an agreement, these minor 
states would be more likely to join cooperative endeavors. This situation is called 
hegemonic stability. Realists, however, do not argue that such a cooperation process 
will automatically begin in the very existence of a hegemon. The existence of a 
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hegemon is necessary but not a sufficient condition for international cooperation. In a 
hegemonic system, the hegemon and some of the minor powers must be in the same 
alliance system.
44
 The hegemon, in such an alliance system, internalize security 
externalities which occur among minor states. Relying on the hegemon, minor powers 
may neglect security externalities, according to hegemonic stability theory. 
Critics of hegemonic stability theory, on the other hand, maintain that the 
hegemon may have the incentive to exploit its minor allies. Joanne Gowa, argues that 
there are two constraints that limit the hegemonic state to exploit its minor allies.
45
 First, 
short-run exploitation may undermine hegemon’s credibility. So, in order to protect its 
long-term interests, the hegemon does not attempt to exploit its partners. This argument 
relies on the idea that the hegemon will most benefit from such a hegemonic system. 
Second, the dependence of hegemon on its minor allies’ wealth gives an incentive to 
hegemon to not exploit them. Since wealthy allies contribute to the maintenance of the 
hegemonic system, the hegemon would have lesser incentive to undermine the wealth of 
its partners, Gowa argues.
46
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 The core argument of structural realist theories is that the structure of 
international politics impels states to seek power and security. The structure of 
international politics is anarchic, as realists and many liberals agree. This, however, 
does not mean that international politics is chaotic. Anarchy means the absence of a 
higher government over national governments. In this situation, states placed in the 
international system wish to survive. In order to ensure their survival states seek to 
enhance their security. Therefore, international politics is a competitive realm. In such a 
situation, security-seeker states are less likely to cooperate. 
 Further, according to structural realists, there are two major barriers which 
prevent states to cooperate even if their interests converge in a given policy domain. 
These are the problems of relative gains and cheating. Relative gain is a problem for 
international cooperation because states check who gains more. As Waltz puts, states do 
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not ask “Will both ıf us gain?”, rather they ask “Who will gain more?”47 The latter is 
important because a state may convert the economic benefits that it gained from 
cooperation into its military capacity. Increasing military capacity of a state decreases 
the security of the others. This is known as the simple security dilemma of international 
politics.
48
 Security dilemma occurs because there is no supreme authority over states to 
assure their survival. This drives states to ensure their security and to be skeptic about 
each other’s intentions. 
As understood, structural realists maintain that it is difficult for states to decide 
and initiate cooperation. The relative gains problem is the most important barrier for 
international cooperation. Defensively positioned states are more prone to focus on their 
relative losses rather than absolute gains. However, the structural realist arguments 
presented above have shortcomings with respect to the fact that cooperation is a 
recurrent pattern of international relations. Indeed, states could also initiate cooperation 
if certain conditions are met. In the following chapter, I will introduce the arguments of 
power symmetry and the number of actors to explain conditions under which states are 
more likely to initiate cooperation. 
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Cooperation under the security dilemma. World politics, 30(2), 167-214. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORY: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This thesis proposes a two-structured analytical framework which intertwines 
theories of structural realism and rational bargaining to understand and explain the 
problem of international cooperation. The framework, first, requires the application of a 
structural realist theory; and second, the application of a rational bargaining theory. In 
this chapter, I will examine the structural realist part of the framework. In order to 
explain the conditions under which security-seeker states more inclined to initiate 
cooperation, I will introduce two arguments derives from structural realism—the 
arguments of power symmetry and the number of actors.  As the framework proposes, 
these arguments based on a set of structural variables which affect the likelihood of 
international cooperation conjointly. First, I will present the power symmetry argument 
which claims that equal distribution of power decreases the level of fear among states. 
Then, I will introduce the number of actors argument which claims that concerns over 
relative gains problem decrease as the number of actors involved in an issue increases. 
4.2 The Power Symmetry Argument 
 Most realists emphasize the role of power. Power is the currency of international 
politics, according to realists.
49
 States can conduct certain behaviors only if they have a 
capacity to do so. As noted above, structural realists argue that the anarchic structure of 
international politics impels states to seek power to ensure their survival and realize 
their secondary preferences. 
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From a systemic point of view, however, it makes little sense that how much 
power a unit possesses. Systemic theories deal with distribution of power, not the 
absolute power of individual units, to explain certain behaviors of the states in a system. 
Distribution of power in a system determines the way in which states perform certain 
behaviors. This is why a systemic theory does not take into account how much power a 
unit has but how total power is distributed among the units in a system. For example, 
the power of the United States makes sense compared to the total and particular power 
of other states in the system. A systemic theory would expect different behaviors from 
the United States depending on whether a counter power exists in the system. 
As the distribution of power is the most important dimension of a system, 
variances in the distribution of power determine the configuration of power in that 
system. Different configurations of power cause various international outcomes that 
emerge as the collective result of states’ behavior. With respect to international 
cooperation, a systemic theory of international relations takes into account variances in 
the distribution of power in the system. Therefore, a systematic theory that attempts to 
explain international cooperation asks the following question: What type of a 
distribution of power makes international cooperation is more likely to emerge? 
This thesis argues that such a type of distribution of power that allows states to 
overcome obstacles to security dilemma would lead states more likely to initiate 
cooperation if they need to cooperate in a specific policy area. Such a distribution of 
power leads an international system in which states are less sensitive against the effects 
of security dilemma so that they could neglect negative implications of the relative 
gains problem. The lesser the states fear each other, the more they likely to decide to 
cooperate. 
The intensity of security dilemma affects the level of fear, and fear affects the 
likelihood of conflict. Low-intensity security dilemma reduces the likelihood of conflict 
by reducing the level of fear. Therefore, if states are less sensitive against the effects of 
security dilemma, international systems are more stable. The sensitivity of states against 
the effects of security dilemma is measured by whether states perceive each other as an 
immediate threat. The type of distribution of power in a system would determine the 
fact that whether states assess each other as a potential threat.   
25 
 
With respect to types of distribution of power, the central argument of this thesis 
is that if power is distributed evenly among states in a system, the intensity of security 
dilemma would be low. Equal distribution of power would decrease the chances of 
states to achieve hegemony. Since states fear each other less in such a situation, the 
system would be more stable. Stability would provide predictability in power 
calculations to a certain extent. In this regard, it is important to understand the 
relationship between the distribution of power and stability. 
In the extant literature concerning distribution of power and stability, there are 
two competing theories. These are theories of balance of power and preponderance of 
power.
50
 The central argument of balance of power theories is that equal distribution of 
power leads to more peaceful orders because no single unit is able to change the status 
quo in a short period of time.
51
 The preponderance of power scholars, on the other hand, 
argue that uneven distribution of power among units creates more peaceful orders as 
there will be no great war because second-tier states are not able to challenge the 
hegemon.
52
 
To begin with, scholars like Organski argue that preponderance of power 
systems are more stable and peaceful. In such systems, there is one hegemonic state and 
many minor states. Minor states will not be able to challenge the hegemonic state since 
there is a high power disparity between the hegemon and minor states. This power gap 
leads minor states to believe that they would not win a war against the hegemon. So, the 
probability of conflict is decreased, according to the theory. Relying on this logic, the 
theory further suggests that international trade and cooperation will be more likely 
under the leadership of a hegemon since that hegemon would promote international 
trade in order to maintain its position. 
This account, however, has flaws in certain aspects. First, it bears a biased 
argument that the stronger side will win a major war. However, there is a remarkable 
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historical record that weaker states could also win wars. Second, the theory downplays 
the probability that minor powers could build counterbalancing coalitions against the 
hegemon given the fact that the balance of power is the recurrent pattern of international 
politics. Even if we accept the flawed assumption that stronger sides win wars, a more 
powerful counterbalancing coalition would easily believe that it could overthrow the 
hegemon. As the prospect for victory increases, the coalition may be more prone to 
initiate a war. In such situations, crises may escalate into unnecessary conflicts 
generating an unstable international system. Third, the hegemon may behave 
aggressively in the absence of an opposite equal power to prevent it. Then, hegemons 
could easily attack minor powers. For example, when the United States attacked 
Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, no state could stand against it. Finally, the theory 
neglects the probability of conflict among minor powers. Second-tier states under the 
shadow of the hegemon may go to war in order to secure and advance their positions in 
the system. It is not guaranteed that the hegemon would prevent such conflict among 
minor power since the hegemon itself could benefit such conflicts. 
According to balance of power theories, international systems are more peaceful 
and stable if power is distributed evenly among actors. When power inequalities are 
higher among units, the potential for successful hegemonic aggression is increased.
53
 If 
power is distributed evenly among the states in a system, no state can easily achieve 
hegemony. This logic can also be applied to regional systems. In a certain region, if 
there is no a higher power disparity between the powerful states and the second-tier 
states, the likelihood of conflict is decreased. This situation, hence, leads to stability and 
peace in that region. States located in that region would asses that their security is less 
threatened in a predictable time period. Therefore, they would believe that the balance 
of power in the domain will not change immediately if they cooperate. 
All in all, states are more likely to initiate cooperation in systems where total 
power is distributed evenly among nations. This is because of the fact that the intensity 
of security dilemma which prevents cooperation in such systems would be low. 
Accordingly, in a balance of power system, the cost of war will be high because the 
states are roughly equal in terms of material power. The high cost of war would reduce 
the chances of successful aggression. States, therefore, will find no opportunity for a 
“cheap victory”. The increased cost of war and aggression would lead states in the 
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system to not fear each other. Therefore, states will be more inclined to initiate 
cooperation if they need to coordinate their policies in a certain policy area. 
4.3 The Number of Actors Argument 
 Standard structural realist theories argue that the major barrier to international 
cooperation is the relative gains problem. This study recognizes that the relative gains 
problem is a crucial factor for states considering their security. Yet the study argues that 
this problem, is not, in fact, a factor as determinant as structural realists argue. 
“The relative gain matters” argument is based on the implicit realist assumption 
that there are only two states in the world. Accordingly, when the possibility of 
cooperation emerges between two states, these two states will have to focus on their 
relative gains. However, there are also cooperation settings include more than two 
states. This is an important fact to ponder so that one accurately explain why states join 
international cooperation. If the number of actors involved in a cooperation setting 
increases, the negative effects of the relative gains problem would decrease. One should 
note the fact that, at this point, increasing numbers of actors does not cause a reduction 
in gains obtained from cooperation but a reduction in the relative gains concern. 
In order to better explain the effect of a larger number of actors, illustrating the 
following cooperating setting would be helpful. Suppose that the state A would 
cooperate with the state B. In the first step both of states would concern about who will 
gain more, as the conventional realist logic operates. Further, suppose that the state A 
would gain more than the state B if they cooperate. In this case, the state B would not be 
eager to cooperate with the state A. However, this logic operates only if there are two 
states—the state A and the state B, in the cooperation setting. In a situation in which 
more than two actors are involved cooperation, the state B would have the chance to 
cooperate with the state C at the same time. Cooperating with the state C, the state B 
may gain more, while the state C may be the more gaining side with the cooperation 
with another state, the state D. The state D, on the other hand, may gain more or less in 
different alternative cooperation dyads with other states. These dyads may be expanded 
to cover the states E, F, G. The larger the number of states, the more the cooperation 
dyads. As a consequence of this, even if the states in a system act through the relative 
gains concern, as the standard structural realists logic argue, they would effort to 
increase their absolute gains within possible cooperation dyads. As states neglect the 
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relative gains concern and focus on their absolute gains, they will be more likely to 
initiate cooperation if they need to cooperate in a certain policy area. 
Another factor that will make the relative gains concern less important for states 
is the fact that states that are not involved in cooperation would fall behind those who 
involved in cooperation. While cooperative states increase their absolute gains by 
cooperating, a non-cooperative state will be worse off compared to the cooperating 
states. Stated differently, cooperating states will be better off with respect to the non-
cooperative states. Given this fact non-cooperative states, even they concerned with 
relative gains problem, would be willing to be cooperative. Non-cooperative behavior 
brings costs to them. This situation, in the literature, is called “defensive cooperation.” 
As Duncan Snidal notes “states will cooperate for fear that other states will get ahead 
by cooperating among themselves.”54 Randall Schweller, on the one hand, explains this 
situation in a more detailed fashion as follows: 
“[…] According to the neorealist position, state A will turn down a 
cooperative arrangement with state B in which both sides make gains but B 
achieves greater gains than A. The logic is that anarchy forces states to be 
security-, not power-, maximizers. The problem with this argument is: if A 
accepts B's offer, it might be less secure with respect to B, but by increasing 
its absolute capabilities A will be in a relatively better position vis-a-vis all 
outsiders to the agreement. Moreover, suppose that another state, C, accepts 
B's offer.  A, having refused to cooperate with B, is now relatively less 
secure with respect to both B and C. In other words, A loses two ways 
instead of one: it is weaker both in absolute and relative terms.  In addition, 
B might be less likely to seek future cooperation with A, even be hostile to 
A, because it has proven to be a distrusting friend.  In  short,  the  realist  
view  of  the  relative-  gains  problem  is  misleading  because it  does  not  
take into  account  outside targets  of  comparison  and  alternative  
scenarios,  that  is,  that  another  state will accept the offer  despite the gap 
in gains advantaging its partner(s)."
55
   
As it can be understood from the above discussion, states are supposed to 
consider their relative gains because of security concerns, but states would still have to 
pursue their absolute gains in order to maintain and advance their positions in the 
system. Therefore, absolute-gains seeker states would make international cooperation 
more likely to emerge. The relative gains problem would matter on whether states to 
initiate cooperation if there are only two states in a cooperation setting. In a cooperation 
                                                                
54 Snidal, D. (1991). International cooperation among relative gains maximizers. International Studies Quarterly, 
35(4), p. 401. 
55 Schweller, R. L. (1996). Neorealism's status‐ quo bias: What security dilemma?. Security Studies, 5(3), p 109-110. 
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setting includes more than two actors, states do not have “the luxury of not cooperating” 
since the fact that they would face to the probability of falling into a less favorable 
position with respect to others, as they avoid to cooperate. Indeed, non-cooperative 
behavior would jeopardize states’ security. 
The number of actors argument suggest that states tend to increase their absolute 
gains rather than their relative gains. In this regard, the argument resembles liberal 
theories. The argument, however, differs from liberal theories on the cause of the 
absolute gains seeking behavior. Liberal international relations theories argue, states act 
purposefully, the basic behavior of the goal-oriented states in the anarchic international 
system is to maximize their absolute gains. For this reason, liberals argue that 
cooperation, not conflict, is essential in international relations. The state, according to 
liberals, is rational, egoistic, and atomistic. The argument presented in this section, on 
the other hand, argues that when faced with the probability of cooperation, states care 
about their absolute gains because of the systemic forces.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 This framework refines the argument that states are concerned with absolute 
gains, by relying on the structural realist logic which argues that states are positionalist 
not atomistic actors. We reach the conclusion that states would seek to maximize their 
absolute gains even if we stand from a structural realist perspective. Accordingly, in the 
anarchic structure of international politics, states’ priority is to ensure their security. 
Since states placed positionally, they struggle to maintain and advance their positions in 
the system. Therefore, when faced with the probability of cooperation, they would avoid 
non-cooperative behaviors. If they avoid cooperation, they could fall behind their 
partners. 
The framework presented in this thesis argues that the relative gains concern 
would become less important to states if the total power is evenly distributed in a 
region. In addition to power symmetry, the framework argues that if a larger number of 
actors is involved in the issue, states would be less concerned about relative losses since 
they have the opportunity to neutralize their losses with gains in more favorable 
cooperation dyads. Consequently, the relative gains problem would be a weak incentive 
for states under such conditions. 
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Once states decide to cooperate, then a negotiation process begins. In this 
process, states interact strategically. In the next chapter, I will present a rational 
bargaining theory that argues the relative bargaining power of states effects whether 
states extract (or grant) concessions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RATIONAL BARGAINING THEORY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 As this thesis argues international cooperation is best understood through two 
theories structured in one framework of analysis, we first applied structural realist 
theory to understand under what conditions security seeker states are likely to 
cooperate. As for the second step, the framework employs a rational bargaining theory 
in order to explain the outcomes of interstate negotiation. In this chapter, I will examine 
the second step of the framework. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, once states decide to cooperate, a new 
process begins. This is a negotiation process in which states bargain over the terms of 
an agreement. Stated differently, states would struggle to make sure that the terms of the 
negotiated agreement fall close to their preferred point. The framework argues the 
rational bargaining power of the cooperating states determine whether they get what 
they want in this process. Given the importance of relative bargaining power, this 
chapter explores the following question: What are the sources of relative bargaining 
power? To understand the sources of bargaining power and the determinants of 
interstate negotiation, this chapter, first, underlies the importance of relative bargaining 
power. Secondly, it employs a rational bargaining theory to understand the dynamics of 
bargaining settings.  
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5.2 Relative Bargaining Power and Interstate Negotiations 
 Structural realists argue that material power based on military force and 
economic resources is the principal tool to take concessions from others.
56
 However, 
there is a remarkable historical record that small states were able to escape offering 
concessions to larger states under certain circumstances. This is because of their relative 
bargaining power vis-à-vis larger states. There are also cases in which larger states were 
able to take concessions from their weaker partners due to their relative bargaining 
power, not material power. In a non-coercive bargaining setting, therefore, the disparity 
in states' assets other than material power determine negotiation outcomes, while 
military power is the most important tool for persuading others not to attack when the 
probability of conflict rises. This thesis does not downplay the role of material power in 
conducting international affairs. The role of material power is recognized in the 
previous chapters which explain why states initiate cooperation.
57
 
Once states sit around a negotiation table, a new game begins. Muthoo notes that 
this is a kind of strategic interaction in which “the players have common interests to 
cooperate but have conflicting interest over how to cooperate.”58 This is the negotiation 
process which is also called as "bargaining situation". In such situations, Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig note: 
“States must overcome collectively suboptimal outcomes and achieve 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, yet at the same time they 
must decide how the mutual gains of cooperation are distributed among the 
states.”59 
In a bargaining setting which starts after states decided to cooperate, the relative 
bargaining power of the cooperating parties is the most determinant factor. Therefore, 
with respect to interstate negotiation, this thesis, relying on rational bargaining theory, 
argues that the disparity in the relative bargaining power of states would determine to 
what extent states exchange concessions at the international level. The disparity in 
relative bargaining power stems from asymmetric circumstances under which states 
                                                                
56 Krasner, S. D. (1991). Global communications and national power: Life on the Pareto frontier. World politics, 
43(3), 336-366. 
57 Recall the argument that the distribution of material power determines whether states to initiate cooperation if they 
need to cooperate in a specific policy area. 
58 Muthoo, A non-technical introduction to bargaining theory, p. 146. 
59 Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, Liberal intergovernmentalism, p. 71. 
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negotiate. These circumstances determine the bargaining structure which effects states' 
bargaining behavior.
60
 Under the bargaining structure, the framework argues there are 
three factors that determine the bargaining power of states. These are i) unilateral policy 
alternatives ii) outside options iii) urgency of the negotiated issue for a state.
61
 
To start with, one of the most important determinants of relative bargaining 
power is whether a state has the ability to realize its preferences with its own resources. 
This is called unilateral policy alternative. If a state has the ability to go it alone, it is 
less likely to offer concessions to its partners since it does not have to compromise. 
Such states are also self-sufficient states in a given policy area. 
States with unilateral policy alternative would have a maneuver space where 
they could exploit concessions from their partner. Moreover, states that have unilateral 
policy alternatives would have the set of strategies includes even the threat of non-
cooperation. They would enjoy the autonomy that is given by the bargaining structure in 
which they negotiate. 
Moreover, the availability of unilateral policy alternative for a state would 
provide this state to manipulate others’ strategies at the negotiation table. Thus, a 
unilateral policy option would grant bargaining power to states. According to some 
scholars, it is the most fundamental bargaining power.
62
 Therefore we reach the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: If a state has the ability to realize its preferences in a certain policy 
domain through its own resources, the more bargaining power it has. 
To continue with, other than unilateral policy alternative, having alternative 
options is also an important source of bargaining power. Alternative coalitions and 
bargaining partners are two significant bargaining power source. 
If states show credibly that their alternatives are more attractive than the 
negotiated agreement, they would have the leverage to extract concessions. If the 
                                                                
60 McKibben, H. E. (2013). The effects of structures and power on state bargaining strategies. American Journal of 
Political Science, 57(2), 411-427. 
61 See Muthoo, A. (2000). A non-technical introduction to bargaining theory. World Economıcs-Henley On Thames-, 
1(2), 145-166. ISO 690145-166; Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international 
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opposing partners have not such alternatives, they would more likely to offer 
concessions. 
Moreover, states that have alternative options can threat others via “exclusion 
threats.”63 It should be noted that alternative options and proposals need to be credible 
so that states have such options can persuade their partners to offer concessions. 
Otherwise, alternative options considered by other states as empty threats and bluffs 
which have no impacts on the relative bargaining power of a state. Therefore, we 
conclude the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: If a state has credible alternative options for a negotiated agreement, the 
more bargaining power it has. 
Finally, the urgency of preferences is a crucial bargaining power source. In 
certain policy areas, some states may have immediate interests while some states not. 
This is also called as “haggling cost” in the literature of bargaining.64 The haggling cost 
for a state would increase if that state values time much more than its partner in the 
negotiation table. If a state needs an agreement immediately, it is more likely to offer 
concession since it has an urgent interest to be realized. 
 On the other hand, states that do not have urgent preferences would have less 
incentive for an immediate agreement. Therefore, if a state has a weak incentive to 
coordinate its policy in a certain policy area, it would be less willing to offer 
concessions. In such situations, states with weak incentive to grant concessions are 
more likely to persuade its partners to offer concessions. This leads us to build the third 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: A state's bargaining power is higher if it does not have urgent 
preferences to be realized. 
Consequently, the relative bargaining power of states is the main determinant on 
whether states strike a deal at the international level. The incentive for cooperation is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for reaching an agreement. Once states sit at the 
table to reach an agreement, they begin to strategically interact with each other relying 
on their relative bargaining power. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I built three hypotheses relying on previous literature on rational 
bargaining theories. The hypotheses are below: 
H1: Unilateral policy alternative: If a state has the ability to realize its 
preferences in a certain policy domain through its own resources, the more bargaining 
power it has. For example, in the context of European integration, if the member states 
can balance a threat with their own resources, they are less likely to be cooperative in 
the military realm. 
H2: Alternative options: If a state has credible alternative options for a 
negotiated agreement, the more bargaining power it has. 
H3: Urgency of preferences: A state's bargaining power is higher if it does 
not have urgent preferences to be realized. In the context of European integration, if a 
member state faced an immediate security and economic problem, it will be more 
willing to grant concessions to its partners in a bargaining setting. 
In the following chapter, I will examine the case of the European Defense 
Community. Specifically, I will focus on the negotiations between two major powers, 
Germany and France. I will show how relative bargaining power of both states affects 
the negotiations outcomes at the international level. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY AND THE FRANCO-GERMAN 
BARGAINING 
 
6.1 The European Defense Community 
 In this chapter, I will examine the international level negotiation process of the 
European Defense Community (EDC) which took place between 1950 and 1952. The 
EDC was a plan which envisaged a European defense organization between France, 
Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and West Germany.
65
 It was proposed by 
France as a response to a possible German rearmament. Even though the government of 
France had proposed the project, French National Parliament eventually refused to 
ratify the agreement in 1954. After the failure of the EDC, Germany gradually started a 
limited re-armament within NATO. 
6.2 The Brief Background 
 Immediately after the Second World War, one of the most important problems 
for the European security order besides the Soviet threat was the question of German 
rearmament. Germany wanted to have a military to ensure its national security. 
However, given the Nazi experience and continuing Allied occupation, a unilateral 
rearmament was not a viable option for Germany and the other major European power, 
France.
66
 At that time, France was a NATO member while Germany was not. The 
United States, on the other hand, had an enormous military presence in Europe. 
American elites were considering whether to withdraw some of American troops from 
                                                                
65 I will use Germany and West Germany interchangeably unless I directly refer to East Germany. 
66 Helga Haftendorn, Germany’s accession to NATO: 50 years on, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Peace-
Building/Germany-accession-NATO/EN/index.htm (Accessed: 1st June 2017). 
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the continent.
67
 This might have led to a German rearmament. West Germany was 
concerned about its own security in the face of Soviet expansionism. The United States 
thus began to consider a limited German rearmament within the NATO framework.
68
 
The US proposed a plan which envisaged Germany being invited to NATO. France, on 
the other hand, was very suspicious about the prospect of German militarization. As a 
NATO member, France had satisfied its immediate security concerns which derived 
from the Soviet Union. However, German rearmament could lead to a feeling of 
insecurity for the French, because the legacy of the Second World War was still vivid at 
that time. Under these conditions, the French government proposed a European army 
including German troops under a supranational command and control organization.
69
 
According to the proposed plan, the head of the organization would be a French officer 
and Germany would have a limited sized military under this command. Thus, two 
solutions to the German rearmament problem emerged. The first one was a NATO 
solution which envisioned German rearmament within the alliance. The second one was 
France's EDC plan which envisaged German rearmament within a European army. For 
the NATO solution, the Petersberg Conference was held, while simultaneously the Paris 
Conference organized o establish the EDC plan. 
During the negotiation processes, France managed to block the Petersberg 
Conference because it had an alternative proposal, the EDC plan.
70
 When the Petersberg 
talks ended, Germany shifted its policy goals to the Paris Conference for the EDC 
plan.
71
 Even though EDC was not the best option, Germany had to make a deal given its 
weak bargaining power compared to France.. 
6.3 Primary Actors 
 In this study, I regard nation-states as the primary actors in international politics. 
In order to examine the case empirically, I assume that government leaders (and their 
cabinets) are principal actors who act on the behalf of their country. They conduct 
necessary and relevant policies in certain areas to ensure their countries' specific goals 
and preferences. 
                                                                
67 Fursdon, E. (1980). The European defense community: a history. Springer. 
68 Ibid., pp. 92-99. 
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Following the structural realist logic, national preferences in the security domain 
do not stem from domestic politics. Preferences in the security realm are formed by 
mainly structural factors. The anarchic nature of international politics impels states to 
maintain their survival. I, however, do not argue that security is the only preference for 
states.  Preferences are not fixed, they vary. A preference is not a strategy, tactic or 
policy.
72
 
In this chapter, I take security preferences as having their roots in the structure of 
international politics. Despite the fact that domestic actors (i.e. institutions, opposition 
leaders) have a lesser impact on states' quest for security, they may affect the "security 
policy" of states. The point is that seeking security derives from the structure while 
policies or strategies to achieve security are shaped by domestic conditions of a state. 
For example, national parliaments, including opposition parties, are domestic actors 
which affect the orientation of states' security policies and strategies. However, states 
would behave as unitary and integrated actors at the international level. This is why a 
systemic theory neglects the domestic factors in understanding international outcomes. 
6.4 The Balance of Power in Post-War Western Europe 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, if the total power is symmetrically distributed among 
nations located in a certain geographic domain, these nations are more likely to initiate 
cooperation if they need, since they believe that the gains obtained from cooperation 
would not change the balance of power immediately. In realist theories, the balance of 
power is considered in terms of the material capacity not in ideational and cultural 
terms. Since the framework presented in this study offers a structural realist account to 
explain the conditions in which states decide to initiate cooperation, I measure balance 
of power with respect to states' material capacity. To do so, I obtained data from the 
Correlates of War Project's National Material Capabilities (NMC, V5.0) dataset that 
includes six indicators; military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, 
iron, and steel production, urban population, and total population.
73
 The dataset is very 
useful since it also contains the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) index 
that aggregates the abovementioned six variables. The CINC gives the average of states' 
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73 See Singer, J. D. (1988). Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985. 
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share of total power for each element of material capability, ranging between "0" and 
"1" while "0" indicates the given state has no share in total power in a given year. 
Below I will compare the power of the states that decided to negotiate over the EDC 
plan; Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Italy in 1950.  
 The balance of power in Western Europe immediately after the World War II 
was stable because none of the states in the region had the material capacity to launch a 
bid for hegemony. Given their population and economic capacity; France and Germany 
were major powers in the region. Germany was defeated while France was warworn. 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands were middle powers while Luxembourg was a 
small state given their material capacity. Table 2 shows their material capabilities. The 
NMC does not provide data for Germany for the years between 1946-1954 since 
Germany was gradually gaining its sovereignty. Table 3 shows Germany and France 
material capability in 1955.
74
 I compared France and Germany since both were major 
powers in Western Europe. As seen in Table 3, France and Germany shared a roughly 
equal portion of power. That means power was distributed equally between both states.  
Table 1: Material Capabilities of Western European States 
Country Military 
Expenditure 
(thousands 
of current 
year US 
Dollars) 
Military 
Personnel 
(thousands) 
Iron and 
steel 
production 
(thousands 
of tons) 
Energy 
consumption 
(thousands 
of coal-ton 
equivalents) 
Total 
Population 
(thousands) 
Urban 
population 
(population 
living in 
cities with a 
population 
greater 
than 
100,000; in 
thousands) 
Composite 
Index of 
National 
Capability 
(CINC) 
score 
France 1489278 595 8652 81344 41736 6892 .0332216 
Italy 564799 235 2362 17468 47104 9374 .017447 
Belgium 166920 74 3777 26698 8639 886 .0082221 
Netherlands 236794 226 490 25202 10114 3182 .0081174 
Luxembourg 2548 3 2279 1123 294 0 .0027704 
 
Table 2: Material Capabilities of Germany and France in 1955 
Country Military 
Expenditure 
(thousands 
of current 
year US 
Dollars) 
Military 
Personnel 
(thousands) 
Iron and 
steel 
production 
(thousands 
of tons) 
Energy 
consumption 
(thousands of 
coal-ton 
equivalents) 
Total 
Population 
(thousands) 
Urban population 
(population living 
in cities with a 
population 
greater than 
100,000; in 
thousands) 
Composite 
Index of 
National 
Capability 
(CINC) 
score 
Germany 1757856 205 21336 183759 52364 14834 .0377847 
France 2948000 802 12592 98982 43428 7343 .0306306 
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 As seen in Table 2 and 3, there was no huge power disparity between the states. 
As a matter of course, some of them were stronger while others were relatively weak. 
However, given their material capabilities and CINC scores, no single state could have 
achieved hegemony in the post-WWII period. In 1950, for example, the CINC score of 
the United States was .284443. Comparing the power of the United States and Western 
European would be more meaningful to evaluate whether one of the Western European 
states could have become the hegemon. 
6.5 Preferences of France and Germany 
 The French: France was one of the original twelve signatories to the NATO 
treaty. Thus, it was under the security umbrella of the alliance against a possible Soviet 
attack. However, it was still obsessed with a possible German militarization. As Rene 
Pleven, then-prime minister of France stated the creation of a German army would give 
rise to renewed distrust and suspicion.
75
  
 During that time, the United States was keeping a military force on the 
continent, particularly in the occupied German territories. US elites, on the other hand, 
were considering rearming Germany, in order to establish an effective Western defense 
against Soviets. A possible German contribution to European defense would mitigate 
the American military expenditure for the continent. At this point, Germany’s 
participation in NATO came into question. Accordingly, Germany would have to create 
a military force to contribute to the alliance as a member state. Thus, German 
rearmament became inevitable, since Germany would be a sovereign nation. For the 
French side, the problem was that Germany would have a military force since the 
German rearmament inflames the bad memories of German militarism on French 
security. At the New York Conference held in September 1950, when Americans tried 
to convince France to accept the German rearmament, then-French foreign minister 
Schuman said: "there was a serious psychological problem in France, however, and 
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that it would create serious difficulties."
76
 Prime minister Pleven's statement regarding 
the issue also reflects France's security concerns at that time: 
"The formation of German divisions, of a German Ministry of Defence, 
would sooner or later be bound to lead to the rebuilding of a national army 
and, by that token, to the revival of German militarism."
77
 
 Schuman, further, put France's preference as follows: 
"The position of the French Government which the Government has many 
times asserted. It is as favorable to a progressive integration of Germany 
into a European structure and to her admission to the organizations which 
are the basis of a peaceful cooperation among European states, as it is 
opposed to the idea of any possible discussion of the reconstitution of a 
German military force."
78
 
Given the French security concerns, France proposed a European army which 
envisaged the participation of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg in a supranational defense organization.
79
 This plan was called the 
European Defense Community. The key point for the EDC was that Germany would 
have no officers in the organization, but only individual soldiers. By proposing such a 
plan, France aimed to prevent the emergence of a general staff which would allow 
Germany to plan and conduct a major war. 
 The Germans: West Germany was established in 1949. East German territories 
were under the Soviet control. West Germany’s military and some of its industrial 
infrastructure were destructed by the allies. As a newly established country, West 
Germany was domestically striving for denazification and the reestablishment of its 
institutions while the German government was attempting to build a political 
personality for the new state in the international arena.
80
 West Germany’s chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer pointed it out well: 
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“If the Allies demanded that we should take part in the defense of Western 
Europe, I should be in favor, not of an independent Wehrmacht but of a 
German contingent in a European force. I should be opposed to Germans 
being accepted into, or recruited for, a non-German contingent, or to their 
serving as mercenaries.”81 
 At this point, one of the main goals of Adenauer's government was to build 
"equal" relations with the outside world, particularly with other Western states.
82
 Being 
an equal nation was important for the new state’s foreign policy because West 
Germany, as a defeated nation, was under strict limitations. As a part of the consensus 
between victorious nations of the Second World War, West Germany would have no 
armed forces for a certain time; this was in part because the legacy of the Nazi regime 
remained strong in the memories of the neighboring countries.   
 Furthermore, the Soviet Union, at that time, was maintaining a large-scale 
military power.
83
 Soviet-controlled Eastern Germany, on the other hand, had established 
a police force in order to ensure its domestic stability.
84
 This police force, however, was 
not an ordinary police force. It was a semi-military organization. Under these 
circumstances, West Germany was under a communist threat. It had no army to deal 
with its security concerns. 
 To sum up, German foreign policy was driven by one basic preference: security 
under the equal term. To realize this preference, West Germany had three policy 
options: a) unilaterally build up a military force b) join the NATO alliance b) join a 
European Army.
85
 Unilateral rearmament, in fact, was not an available option at that 
time, given the continued occupation status of West Germany. Thus, West Germany had 
two actual options regarding the rearmament—the NATO solution and the EDC plan. 
6.6 The Bargaining Power of France and Germany 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, the relative bargaining power of states depends on the 
following factors: unilateral policy alternative, credible alternative options, and the 
urgency of preferences. These factors together provide leverages for states to extract 
concessions. Regarding the negotiation process over a possible German rearmament, 
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Table 1 and Table 2 show the relative bargaining power and weaknesses of France and 
Germany. 
Table 3: The Relative Bargaining Power of France 
THE 
PETERSBERG 
CONFERENCE 
AND THE PARIS 
CONFERENCE 
Ability to go to 
unilateral action 
Alternative options Urgency of preferences 
FRANCE France had a 
military. It also 
had some of 
material capacity 
to increase its 
military 
expenditure. 
France was a NATO 
member. So, it was 
under the alliance’s 
security umbrella 
against the Soviets. 
France proposed the 
EDC plan. The 
Conference for the 
EDC was held 
simultaneously with 
the Petersberg 
Conference 
France as a NATO member 
ensured its immediate security 
against a foreign threat like the 
Soviet Union. Since a possible 
German rearmament would be a 
threat to France in the long 
term, France did not perceive 
an immediate threat from 
Germany. 
 
Table 4: The Relative Bargaining Power of Germany 
THE 
PETERSBERG 
CONFERENCE 
AND THE PARIS 
CONFERENCE 
Ability to go to 
unilateral action 
Alternative options Urgency of Preferences 
GERMANY Germany's 
infrastructure for 
building an effective 
military was 
destroyed. Also, 
because of the Nazi 
legacy, it could not 
build a military 
immediately after 
the war. 
The EDC was an alternative 
option for Germany in the 
Paris Conference. However, 
compared to NATO solution, 
the EDC plan was Germany's 
second best option. Germany 
could not propose an 
alternative defense system 
because it had no military at 
that time. Also, it was striving 
to build a political personality 
to maintain its international 
relations. 
Germany as a defeated 
nation had no military at 
the time. It was 
perceiving threats the 
Soviet and East 
Germany. German 
leaders sought to ensure 
the country's security 
problems. Compared to 
other Western European 
nations Germany had 
immediate security 
preferences. 
 
6.7 The Conferences for German Rearmament 
 
 As mentioned above, there were two competing visions for solving the German 
rearmament problem: the NATO solution and the EDC solution. The United States was 
in favor of the NATO solution while France was for the EDC solution. In order to solve 
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the problem, two distinct conferences were held almost simultaneously. The Petersberg 
Conference, which aimed at negotiating Germany’s possible membership and 
contribution to NATO, opened on 9
th
 January of 1951, while the Paris Conference, 
which was for creating a European Army involving German contingents, opened on 15
th
 
February of 1951. France, The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany were 
the participants of the Petersberg Conference. The Paris conference, on the other hand, 
involved Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and Germany. France 
and Germany were the two most important participants in both of the conferences.  
Germany sought security and equality. Therefore, the NATO solution would be 
a better option for the German side. Germany sent a larger delegation to Petersberg. 
This was a sign that Germany preferred a NATO solution over an intra-European 
solution for its security. A telling sign of the German quest for equality was that the 
head of the German delegation Herr Blank when he arrived at Petersberg, refused to 
join the conference unless his car had its parking place alongside those of three VIP 
places reserved for the French, the British and the American delegations.
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France, on the other hand, did not want Germany to have an armed force in a 
NATO framework. That was why it proposed an alternative solution: the EDC plan. 
France’s ability to create an alternative coalition increased its bargaining power vis-à-
vis Germany which was also a bargaining partner in the EDC negotiations that took 
place at the same time. 
France, ostensibly, agreed to attend the Petersberg Conference. In fact, France 
was tactically blocking the negotiations. The main goal of the French was to convince 
both the United States and Germany to accept the EDC plan. In order to achieve that 
end, the French strategy was to ensure the failure of the Petersberg negotiations.
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The French delegation at Petersburg strictly maintained their position against a 
German rearmament. One of the key discussions at the conference regarded the size of 
German military units. The French delegation did not want Germany to create 
“divisions” as a basic military unit. The term “divisions” evoked " the German 
militarism” to the French.88 Since the NATO alliance required an effective contribution 
by its member states, the United States wanted Germany to maintain an effective 
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military power against the Soviet Union. To be an effective power, Germany should 
have had 12 divisions, according to the US planners.
89
 Unless the new German army 
was structured based on divisions, it would be unreasonable for the US to allow 
Germany to have a military. 
The German delegation, on the other hand, needed to reach an urgent solution. 
This situation decreased the Germans’ relative bargaining power. Their cost of haggling 
was higher than the others’ cost. At that time, Germany was dealing with serious 
security problems, such as the Soviet and East German threats. As mentioned 
previously, due to technical and psychological barriers, the German government could 
not undertake a unilateral rearmament. This also decreased Germany’s relative 
bargaining power. Germany needed partner countries to ensure its security. It needed to 
participate in a common defense system that would allow it to create a limited military 
power. Compared to the EDC plan, the NATO solution was preferable, because 
Germany was seeking security under the equal conditions. The EDC plan, on the other 
hand, required Germany to transfer some of its sovereignty to a supranational 
organization. 
As for the United States, the Americans did not have a comprehensive plan for 
integrating Germany into NATO. It also sought to convince France to accept a NATO 
solution for German rearmament. However, both Germany and the United States could 
not offer a viable plan to convince France.
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The Petersberg Conference fell into a deadlock for three reasons. First, France 
could come up with an alternative plan. Second, Germany had urgent security problems. 
Third, Germany and the United States could not propose a tangible plan to assuage 
France’s concerns. In the end, France got what it had wanted: failure of the conference. 
After that, the German government began to believe that a NATO solution was not 
feasible at that time. All these developments gave a chance for the Paris Conference, 
which was hosted by France. 
The German government sent the experienced Petersberg delegation to Paris. 
However, the German position on equal status and the level of integration remained as 
consistent and steady in Paris as it had been at Petersberg.
91
 The German delegation was 
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determined to not accept any proposal which envisaged unequal German participation in 
the organization. Germany could have withdrawn from the conference. This was, in 
fact, a real threat to the talks. The United States would have, in this situation, simply 
proposed the NATO solution again. If this had happened, France would have had no 
alternative, and its bargaining power would have been decreased in the new talks for a 
second NATO solution. At this point, the fact that Germany had an alternative option 
increased their relative bargaining power relative to France. For the sake of the survival 
of the conference, France accepted Germany's demands for equal status. This was a 
major shift from the original proposal, which envisioned unequal German participation. 
As mentioned above, this situation was not acceptable for the German side. 
After a long and hard bargaining process, the terms of the agreement were 
formulated. At the international level, France and Germany came to a realization that 
they would have to coordinate their security policies in order to minimize the negative 
externalities of German rearmament. French got what it had sought in the Petersberg 
Conference since it had the capacity of proposing an alternative plan. Germany with 
urgent security problems had no unilateral policy alternative vis-à-vis France. As for the 
Paris Conference, Germany could extract a concession because it had an alternative 
option. Consequently, the states reached an agreement at the international level in 1952. 
As for the domestic level, the agreement was supposed to be ratified by domestic 
parliaments so that it could come into force. The German parliament ratified the 
agreement. However, the French parliament rejected the agreement in 1954. Notice that 
although the agreement was signed in 1952 at the international level, it was submitted to 
the French parliament's approval in 1954. During this period, various political changes 
took place both in France and international politics. The fact that the approval process 
took 2 years is an important research topic in terms of linkages between domestic 
politics-international politics. Since this thesis’ scope of analysis is interstate 
negotiations at the international level, I omitted domestic level factors which require 
different types of analytical tools. Merging domestic factors into the framework of the 
thesis would have increased its descriptive accuracy, however, it would weaken its 
parsimoniousness and explanatory power. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This study explores the following questions: Under what conditions security 
seeker states are more likely to initiate cooperation? What determines negotiation 
outcomes at the international level? The study offers an analytical framework which 
argues international cooperation and negotiation can best be explained through two 
theories, arrayed in a multistage model, which takes its fundamental assumptions from 
theories of structural realism and rational bargaining. The framework, first, attempts to 
explain conditions under which states initiate cooperation. Second, it employs a rational 
bargaining theory to elucidate how states extract and grant concessions. 
The central argument of the framework is that when total power is evenly 
distributed in a region, states located in that region would be more likely to initiate 
cooperation if they need to cooperate in a certain policy area. In addition, if the number 
of cooperating actors increases, the states are less likely to avoid from cooperating. In 
such situations, states can compensate for their relative losses from one cooperation 
dyad with another favorable cooperation dyads. Consequently, equal distribution of 
power and a larger number of actors would increase the likelihood of the initiation of 
cooperation. 
However, the initiation of cooperation does not imply that the involving states 
would easily strike an agreement. Once states decide to cooperate, a new strategic 
interaction in which states bargain begins. As for this bargaining process, the 
framework argues that the relative bargaining power of states is the main factor that 
determines negotiation outcomes. States with higher bargaining power at the negotiation 
table would be more likely to extract concessions from their partners. The determinants 
of relative bargaining power are as follows: i) unilateral policy alternative ii) available 
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alternative options iii) urgency of preferences. Combined together, these factors would 
grant bargaining power to states. Therefore, states that have the asymmetric advantage 
of these factors would make sure that the agreement is closer to its ideal point. 
As for the empirical part of the study, the framework focuses on the origins of 
the European integration process. With this regard, it deals with the negotiation process 
of the European Defense Community. To illustrate the case, the thesis delves into the 
relative bargaining power of France and Germany. Employing case study and analytical 
narrative methods together, the thesis shows first how the extant balance of power 
dynamics could lead states in a certain domain to initiate cooperation. Second, the thesis 
shows that how the relative bargaining power of Germany and France affected whether 
both states make concessions during the two separate conferences. Regarding the 
negotiations, the framework concludes that it was not the military power matters most 
but the relative bargaining power of both states. 
This thesis contributes to the debates on international cooperation and European 
integration by refining the standard structural realist logic on the relative gains problem. 
The thesis shows how absolute gains matters most to states even if they already placed 
positionally in the system. In a cooperation setting, as the number of cooperating actors 
with equal power increases, the relative gains problem becomes less salient. In addition 
to the structural perspective, the thesis also employs a rational bargaining theory to 
explain negotiation outcomes at the international level. 
I acknowledge that this thesis may have some limitations. This does not mean 
that the argument presented in the thesis is flawed. I omitted some factors in order to 
reach a parsimonious and comprehensive explanation. This thesis does not deal with 
domestic preference formation process since it stands from a systemic point of view in 
terms of theory. The way in which preferences formed may affect states' decision on 
cooperation and conflict over an issue. In this regard, domestic politics and structures 
are important factors determining state behavior. There is also a vast literature on 
domestic factors and international cooperation.
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In addition to the theoretical limitations, I mostly relied on secondary resources 
in order to collect data and present evidence in the empirical part of the study. However, 
this is mostly because of the lack of primary data sources which one can access. Also, 
time and budget constraints did not allow me to collect most of available primary data 
resources.   
Abovementioned limitations can be improved in future research. A theory or 
model that contains how domestic and international factors interplays in determining 
states relative bargaining power would offer an important contribution to the literature 
on international cooperation. In addition, as this thesis does not deal with 
institutionalization of cooperation, further studies focusing on systemic factors and 
institutional design would also expand our understanding of international cooperation. 
Finally, as this thesis focuses on the initiation of international cooperation, the 
framework of the thesis could be refined to cover the evolution of cooperation which is 
a process contains both persistence and advancement of international cooperation. 
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